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Abstract
This paper studies how land reform and population growth affect land inequality
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household divisions and land market transactions. Theoretical predictions of a model of
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Land is the pre-eminent asset in rural sectors of developing countries, the primary deter-
minant of livelihoods of the poor. Accordingly, the role of land reform on productivity,
inequality, poverty, local governance and social capital in rural areas of LDCs is an impor-
tant topic of academic research with significant policy relevance (e.g. Berry and Cline, 1979;
Binswanger et al., 1993; Besley and Burgess, 2000; Banerjee et al., 2001; Banerjee et al.,
2002; Bardhan, 2004; Besley and Ghatak, 2010; DFID, 2004; The World Bank, 2008).
The bulk of the academic literature has focused primarily on the effects of land reform
on agricultural productivity. A variety of channels by which productivity might be affected
have been studied: relation between farm size and productivity, sharecropping tenancy
distortions, access to credit, investment incentives and labor supply resulting from security
of property rights. Effects on inequality and poverty have not received comparable attention.
The effectiveness of land reforms in changing the distribution of landownership has not
been studied seriously. An exception is Assunção [2008] who studies the effects of the
Brazilian land reform between 1992-2003 on the household land distribution, and finds it
raised land inequality among landowning households, without having any significant effect
on landlessness (after controlling for household and location characteristics). The reasons
for this are not well understood.1
There are a number of possible reasons why land redistribution programs may be in-
effective in lowering land inequality and landlessness. Apart from imposing political and
legal obstacles to implementation of such programs, large landowners frequently attempt to
circumvent them by selling land, splitting their households and subdividing properties so as
to avoid being targeted for expropriation. On the other hand, small landowning households
might be induced to sub-divide so that some resulting fragments own no land and thereby
qualify to receive some of the land being distributed by the program. Landless households
receiving land titles may subsequently sell them in times of distress. Areas embarking on
larger redistributions could attract more landless immigrants, swelling the number of land-
less households. These induced effects on land market transactions, household division and
immigration patterns can indirectly affect the distribution of land in complex ways that
could either augment or offset the direct impacts.
Tenancy regulations which are intended to increase empowerment of tenants (by increas-
ing their post-rent shares and/or security of tenure) do not directly affect the distribution
of land ownership. But they may have important indirect effects. Those owning and leasing
out large amounts of land may see a decline in their returns from leasing, and may subse-
quently be induced to sell much of their land. Additional effects on household division or sale
1De Janvry et al. [1998] provide a general overview of various factors which undermined effectiveness of
land reform programs in various Latin American countries. These include lack of skills, infrastructural and
marketing support of land reform beneficiaries which led to low profitability and subsequent market sales to
larger landowners. Other factors included limited individualization of land rights, and state-led land reform













incentives would arise if the reforms affect the relative profitability of landholdings of various
sizes, owing to induced effects on productivity or local wage rates. For instance, productiv-
ity changes could arise owing to greater reliance on family labor in smaller owner-cultivated
farms (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986), changes in sharecropping distortions (Banerjee et al.,
2002), access to credit for land reform beneficiaries (de Soto, 2000) or effects on irrigation
investments (Bardhan et al., 2012). Wage rates could be altered as a result of changes in
demand for hired labor from large landowners, the supply of wage labor by reform benefi-
ciaries (Besley and Burgess, 2000) or increased flow of immigrants hoping to benefit from
future reform implementations. These indirect general equilibrium effects could supplement
or offset the direct partial equilibrium effects.
The task of evaluating implementation difficulties and obtaining evidence of these in-
direct effects is complicated by the fact that the process of development simultaneously
involves significant demographic and sociological changes that affect household structure,
and thereby the land distribution. Traditional family structures in LDCs involving cohabi-
tation and joint ownership of productive land by multiple nuclear units tend to give way to
nuclear households as a result of a desire for increasing economic independence and rising
intra-household conflicts (Guirkinger and Platteau, 2011, 2012). This may be a response
to increases in household size resulting from falling mortality rates. Economic growth and
increased financial development reduce the need for members to stay in the same household
in order to share risk or avail of household collective goods (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2002).
Household divisions can significantly affect the distribution of land measured at the house-
hold level in a variety of possible ways. Land inequality would tend to fall (resp. rise) if large
landowning households divide at faster (resp. lower) rates compared with small landowning
households. Isolating the indirect effect of land reforms on land distributions and quantify-
ing their importance vis-a-vis demographic factors in affecting household divisions and land
market transactions is therefore an important and challenging research task.
This paper focuses on the experience of the eastern Indian state of West Bengal during
the last three decades of the 20th century. West Bengal witnessed large changes in land
distribution, high rates of household division and a large land reform program during the
1970s and 1980s compared to other Indian states. Approximately 20% of the rural population
directly benefited from this program, which covered 11% of agricultural land. The size of this
program was comparable to the land reform carried out in Brazil over the period 1992-2003
(Assunção, 2008; Lambais, 2008).2
There were two principal land reform programs implemented in West Bengal: distri-
215% of rural households in West Bengal had received land titles by the late 1990s, and the distributed
land area constituted 6% of agricultural area. Another 6% households and agricultural area was covered by
the tenancy registration program (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2011). In a state with a rural population of 12
million households and 8.6 million hectares of agricultural land, this amounted to a program which directly
benefited about two and a half million rural households and affected one million hectares of agricultural land.
In Brazil less than 1% of farm land had been distributed by 1992. Between 1992-2003, the Brazilian land
reforms distributed approximately 10 million hectares of agricultural land (accounting for 5% of agricultural













bution of land titles to the landless, and registration and regulation of tenancy contracts.
Earlier research on the West Bengal land reforms have shown evidence of 4% increases in
farm productivity for the tenancy registration program (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2011),
and a 20% rise in aggregate rice yields at the district level (Banerjee et al., 2002). On the
other hand, Bardhan and Mookherjee [2011] find no significant effects of the land distribution
program on farm productivity, or on wage rates for hired workers for either program.
The main purpose of this paper is to assess the role of the two land reform programs
in changing the land distribution, separating out their respective direct and indirect effects
operating through induced impacts on household division, land market transactions and
migration. We also seek to assess the significance of these effects relative to the direct
effects of growth of population for natural reasons (i.e., difference between birth and death
rates). We use a household and village panel in a sample of 89 villages from the state,
spanning the period from the late 1960s until 2004.
During this period, West Bengal witnessed a marked rise in land inequality, owing prin-
cipally to increased landlessness. Households divided at a rapid rate, resulting in a sharp
decline in land per household. A decomposition exercise helps to measure the direct effects
of land reforms, household division and land market transactions. It shows high rates of
household divisions as the principal driver of increased land inequality.
Household divisions may of course be affected by land reforms. This may represent an
important indirect effect of the land reforms which need to be assessed to evaluate their
overall impact. Land market transactions may also be influenced by land reforms. One
therefore needs to treat household division rates and land market transactions as (poten-
tially) endogenously affected by the land reforms and demographic changes respectively.
Before proceeding to this analysis, we perform a simple reduced form village panel re-
gression to assess the total (sum of direct and indirect) effects of land reform and natural
growth of population between 1978 and 1998. The land distribution program significantly
reduced landlessness, but by an extent less than the direct impact. Both programs reduced
inequality, and the tenancy registration program reduced landlessness, but these effects are
less precisely estimated and less robust with respect to the dataset used. In contrast, natu-
ral increases in population raised inequality significantly, by an extent that dominated the
effects of the land reforms, thereby explaining the overall increase in inequality.
The fact that the net impact of the land distribution program was much smaller than
the direct impact, and that the tenancy reform affected landlessness, suggest the presence of
important indirect effects of the land reform. The rest of the paper seeks to understand the
channels through which these effects may have operated. We treat household divisions and
land market transactions as endogenously determined by underlying changes in household
demographics and changes in farm profitability induced by the land reforms. To this end, we
develop a theoretical model of intra-household joint production among adult members. The
model emphasizes free-riding among members when land is jointly owned and cultivated,
which becomes more significant when household size is large relative to joint land holdings.













household, or for some members to out-migrate. Alternatively, it generates incentives for
the household to buy land.
The model characterizes stable distributions of household sizes and landownership, given
the prevailing wage rate for hired workers, productivity of farms and transaction costs asso-
ciated with land sales. The model is used to derive comparative static effects on household
division and land transactions of exogenous shocks to household size (owing to demographic
changes) and farm productivity (owing to the land reform), which generate empirically
testable predictions.3
With regard to the tenancy registration program, the model predicts (given the observed
productivity effects) lower rates of household division and out-migration uniformly across
disparate land-size classes. Incorporating additional effects on anticipated future reforms
by large landowners, and reduced profitability of leasing out land, it predicts division rates
would drop by less for large landowning households. There would also be increased incentives
for large landowners to sell land to small landowners. Owing to these reasons, the indirect
effects of the tenancy registration program operating through their influence on household
divisions and land market transactions should cause land inequality and landlessness to fall.
Their net indirect effect would be expected to be negative.4
In contrast, the model makes different predictions regarding the net effects of the land
distribution program. One reason is the absence of any significant observed effects of this
program on farm productivity (owing to poor quality and small size of plots distributed)
in the West Bengal context. Hence a key factor generating inequality reducing effects of
the tenancy reform through their effect on household division and market transactions were
missing in the case of the West Bengal land distribution program. Moreover, the land distri-
bution program could cause land inequality to rise for a number of reasons that do not apply
for the tenancy registration program. Since the plots were distributed to those owning no or
little land, it would generate incentives among landowning households to sub-divide so that
some of them would be entitled to enter the beneficiary queue. Such motives are more likely
amongst small landowning households, thereby generating increased landlessness. Moreover,
land distribution to the landless in any given village could induce land-poor households in
other areas to immigrate, thereby swelling the ranks of the landless. A countervailing effect
would arise, however, if large landowning households become motivated to sub-divide or sell
land as stepped-up implementation of the program could signal greater redistributive resolve
of the government in future.
Concerning the effects of demographic changes, the model predicts that growth in house-
3A simplifying assumption made by the model is that the wage rate is given, owing possibly to an
aggregate surplus of labor relative to land available. This assumption is not implausible in the West Bengal
context which has a high population density and a high proportion of landless households (one third in the
late 1960s rising to a half of the overall population by 2000) for whom supplying labor is the main source of
livelihood. Moreover, Bardhan and Mookherjee [2011] find that land reforms had no significant impacts on
wage rates.














hold size would raise the likelihood of household division, controlling for landownership. This
would cause land inequality to rise if smaller landowning families were subject to greater
demographic growth. The effect through the land market would move inequality in the
opposite direction, as households growing faster in size would be more likely to buy land.
We test these predictions on data concerning changes in landholding and household
demographics for the West Bengal household panel. To identify the effect of land reforms
on land inequality, one needs to observe variation in the amount of reform that is plausibly
uncorrelated with other determinants of household division and land transactions. Our
main specification exploits differences in the timing and extent of reforms across villages. A
difference-in-differences design can then filter out common underlying trends and examine
how these variations were associated with changes in division and land market transactions
across households located in different villages.
The assumption underlying this identification strategy is that variations in timing and
extent of land reform were uncorrelated with other time-varying village-specific factors that
may influence household division and land transactions. Banerjee et al. [2002] use this
difference-in-differences approach to examine the effect of the tenancy reforms on farm pro-
ductivity, and argue that the variations in implementation rates of the tenancy registration
program arose primarily owing to idiosyncratic administrative compulsions of the state gov-
ernment. Moreover, Bardhan and Mookherjee [2010] show that a determinant of reform was
the extent of political competition among the two rival parties at higher (district, state and
national) levels, interacted with lagged incumbency at the village level. This reflects greater
incentives for elected officials to implement land reforms owing to re-election pressures in
more contested elections. This allows us to examine robustness of the OLS double-difference
estimates when we use political competition at higher levels as an instrument for tenancy
reform, interacted with lagged local incumbency patterns.5
Using this approach, we estimate the effects of the two land reform programs on house-
hold division and land market transactions. Controlling for household fixed effects, lagged
household size and lagged land owned, we find higher implementation rates of the tenancy
reform in the past three years in the village significantly reduced rates of division of small
landowning households, and raised division rates among large landowning households. It
raised the likelihood of land purchases by small landowning households. These findings are
robust with respect to estimation methods and dataset used. Consistent with the theoretical
predictions, we therefore find that tenancy reforms lowered land inequality owing to their
effects on household divisions and land transactions.
On the other hand, the OLS double-difference estimates of the land distribution program
fail to yield estimates of their effect on household divisions and market transactions that are
comparably precise and robust. The (imprecisely estimated) point estimate of their effect on
rates of household division of small landowning households was positive and quantitatively














large, pointing to one reason why they may have indirectly raised inequality. However, we
do find stronger evidence of one channel by which the land distribution program would have
raised landlessness: it led to higher rates of immigration.
Finally, the results help explain why land inequality rose overall during this period:
the negative effects of the tenancy reform were quantitatively overshadowed by the effects
of population growth. The effect of expanding household size by 1.3 members (the average
effect of population growth observed during this period) on rates of household division turned
out to range between four and twenty five times the effect of either land reform program,
depending on the specification.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the West Bengal land reforms and
the household surveys used to construct the data. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics
of land distribution during this period, including the decomposition of changes in inequality
and the reduced form estimates. Section 4 presents the theoretical model of household
division and land market transactions, followed by the corresponding empirical estimates in
Section 5. Section 6 describes relation to existing literature, while Section 7 concludes.
2 West Bengal Context and Survey Data
2.1 Land Reform Programs
There were two principal land reform programs in West Bengal since the 1960s. The first
represented appropriation of lands (a process known as vesting) above the legislated ceilings
from large landowners, and subsequent distribution of this land to the landless in the form of
titles to small land plots (called pattas). For the state as a whole, P.S. Appu (1996, Appendix
IV.3) estimates the extent of land distributed until 1992 at 6.72% of its operated area, against
a national average for the rest of India of 1.34%. In our sample villages, approximately 15%
of all households in 1998 had received land titles (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2010). However,
many of the distributed land titles pertained to very small plots: in our sample, the average
plots distributed were approximately half an acre in size. According to most accounts, these
plots were of low quality. Recipients were unable to use them as collateral for obtaining
loans from banks.
The other land reform program was Operation Barga, involving registration and regula-
tion of tenancy contracts. In order to plug loopholes on prior legislation, a new Land Reform
Act was passed in the West Bengal state legislature in 1971. This was subsequently amended
in 1977 by the incoming Left Front government to lend further legislative teeth to the pro-
gram. The 1977 Amendment made sharecropping hereditary, rendered eviction by landlords
a punishable offense, and shifted the onus of proof concerning identity of the actual tiller
on the landlord. The state government subsequently undertook a massive drive to identify
and register tenants with the aid of local governments and farmer unions. Registration was
accompanied by a floor on the share accruing to tenants, amounting to 75% (replaced by













by 1981, up from 242,000 in 1978 (Lieten (1992, Table 5.1)), increasing to almost one and a
half million by 1990. Estimates of the proportion of tenants registered by the mid-90s vary
between 80% (Lieten (1992, p. 161)) and 65% (Banerjee et al., 2002). In the villages in
our sample approximately 48% tenants had been registered; these amounted to about 6% of
all households by the late 1990s (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2010). The average size of plot
registered averaged 1.5 acres, and registered tenants could use the registration document as
collateral for a loan from a state financial institution. As with the land title distribution
program, most of the implementation of Operation Barga was carried out between the late
1970s and late 1980s.
Banerjee et al. [2002] found a significant positive effect of the tenancy registration rate on
district rice yields in a double difference OLS regression after controlling for district and year
dummies, crop patterns, infrastructure provided by the state government. Their estimates
imply that the program raised aggregate rice yields at the district level by 20%. Using a
farm cost of cultivation survey for a sample of 89 villages, Bardhan and Mookherjee [2011]
also found a significant but smaller positive effect of the cultivation area within a village
registered under the program on farm value added per acre, after controlling for farm and
year dummies and a range of controls for other farm support programs implemented by local
and state governments.6 No significant effects of the reform on wage rates or employment
for hired labor were found, except in farms leasing in land (which constituted less than 5% of
all farms by the mid-1980s). The productivity increases accrued to farms of all sizes, except
the smallest, with substantial spillover effects on owner cultivated farms. This spillover was
explained in Bardhan et al. [2012] by effects of the reform in reducing the cost of groundwater
owing to induced investments in minor and medium irrigation. There were no significant
effects of the land title program on farm productivity, nor on wage rates.
2.2 Household Survey Details
The survey on which this paper is based covers the same set of 89 villages in West Bengal
studied in Bardhan and Mookherjee [2010, 2011] and Bardhan et al. [2012]. This is a sub-
sample of an original stratified random sample of villages selected from all major agricultural
districts of the state (only Kolkata and Darjeeling are excluded) by the Socio-Economic
Evaluation Branch (SEEB) of the Department of Agriculture, Government of West Bengal,
for the purpose of calculating cost of cultivation of major crops in the state between 1981 and
1996.7 Our survey teams visited these villages between 2003 and 2005, carried out a listing
of landholdings of every household, then selected a stratified random sample (stratifying
by landownership) of approximately 25 households per village (with the precise number
6They estimate the program raised farm productivity by 4%. The magnitude and significance of this
effect was however diminished in a parallel IV regression where potential endogeneity of the tenancy reform
implementation was additionally controlled for.
7The village selection procedure used by SEEB was the following: a random sample of blocks was selected
in each district. Within each block one village was selected randomly, followed by random selection of another













varying with the number of households in each village). 2 additional households were selected
randomly from middle and large landowning categories respectively, owning 5-10 acres and
more than 10 acres of cultivable land, in order to ensure positive representation of these
groups. The stratification of the sample of households was based on a prior census of all
households in each village, in which demographic and landownership details were collected
from a door-to-door survey.
Representatives (typically the head) of selected households were subsequently adminis-
tered a survey questionnaire consisting of their demographic and land history since 1967.8
Response rates were high: only 15 households out of 2400 of those originally selected did
not agree to participate, and were replaced by randomly selected substitutes.
We combine the household-level data with data on the extent of land reform carried
by the land reform authorities in each of these villages since 1971 (available until the year
1998). Additional village-level information is available from previous surveys concerning
various agricultural development programs implemented by local governments, productivity
in the farm panel drawn from these villages for specific subperiods. Data concerning total
number of households in each village, household size, land areas owned and cultivated by
each household in 1978 and 1998 is available from an ‘indirect’ survey in which village elders
compiled household land distributions for each of these two years, based on an enumeration
of voters for each village for those years.
The household survey data includes each household’s land holding at the time of be-
ing surveyed (2004) and as of 1967. Respondents were subsequently asked to list all land
transactions the household participated in between these two dates, for each of the following
categories: acquisitions (purchases, patta (land titles received), gifts and others), dispos-
als (sales, transfers, appropriation by land reform authorities, and natural disaster), and
household division (involving both exits of individual members and household splits). We
focus on agricultural land, both irrigated and unirrigated (in order to determine the relevant
ceiling imposed by the land reform laws, which incorporate irrigation status and household
size). Corresponding changes in household demographics on account of births, deaths, and
marriages were also recorded.
An effort was made in the questionnaire design to distinguish between exit of individual
members and household splitting (where a household sub-unit consisting of at least two
members left the original household). But the questionnaire responses indicate that the
interviewers and respondents tended to lump the two together. In order to avoid double-
counting, we merged the observations that were both in the individual exit and household
splitting datasets. We classified the cause of individual exit and household division into four
categories: death of the member of the household, exit of the spouse of the head due to
death of the head of the household, out-marriage, and exit/division due to other reasons
(such as change in household size, change in income/expenditure, disputes, registration of
8Other questions in the survey included economic status and activities, benefits received from various de-
velopment programs administered by local governments (gram panchayats (GPs)), involvement in activities













tenants and threat of land reforms). Table 5 in the online appendix shows that the latter
category is by far the most relevant, both in terms of frequency of occurrence and amount
of land involved.
Our primary unit of analysis is agricultural land owned by a household for a number
of reasons. The focus on land is natural given its pre-eminent role in determining incomes,
consumption and occupational patterns, and the fact that its measurement is prone to
less error than income or consumption. Table 1 provides evidence of the correlation between
land ownership and income, consumption and occupation patterns. In panel A, which shows
sources of income by land category, we can observe that total income is highly correlated
with land ownership, due to the relevance of farm income in total income. Wage earnings
constitute the main source of income for landless households. Panel B shows patterns of
consumption, where we observe a similar pattern as in panel A: landed households have
more access to durable goods. Finally, in panel C we see that similar to panel A, the main
occupation of adults in landless households is non-agricultural work. The proportion of
household heads reporting cultivation on owned land as their primary occupation rose from
12% among marginal landowners to between 23-26% for those owning more land.
Choosing the household as the unit of observation is conventional in studies of land
inequality, in India and elsewhere, since land is typically cultivated jointly with sharing
of resulting incomes by household members. Table 2 shows evidence of joint production.
Specifically, it shows that among households with at least one male adult engaged in self-
cultivation, the proportion of those with at least one pair of adult male siblings engaged in
self-cultivation rose from 6% among marginal landowners to 16% among small landowners,
32% among medium landowners, and over 40% among large and big landowners.9
Problems of attrition are low at the level of households, owing to low rates of migration
of entire households which co-exist with substantial migration of individuals. In a follow-
up survey conducted in 2011 with the same set of households in the 2004 survey, only 15
households out of the original sample of 2,402 households could not be traced owing to all its
members having moved out. Over a seven year period this amounts to an attrition of 0.62%.
Extrapolating this to the 35 year period covered by the survey, the attrition is estimated at
3.12%.10 And even if all members of a household were to move out, they could not carry
9In this table, ‘self-cultivation’ is defined to take place if it is reported as either the primary or secondary
occupation of the respondent.
10This backward extrapolation is likely to over-estimate the attrition rate, since the migration of entire
households increased during the 2000s in West Bengal: the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS)
displays a 1.24% yearly attrition for the 1982–1999 period, compared to a 1.38% for the 1999–2006 period
(we thank Mark Rosenzweig for providing us these numbers). In addition, overall migration rates also
increased in India during the same period: The NSS 38th round for 1983 reports migration rates per 1,000
inhabitants of 209 and 316 for rural and urban, respectively; while the NSS 64th round for 2007–2008 reports
corresponding rates of 261 and 354 (National Sample Survey Office, 2010, statement 4.3). Our extrapolated
attrition rate compares favorably with 4.7% attrition in the Indonesian Family Life Survey for a seven year














their land with them: they would have to sell or gift it to others remaining in the village.
Hence land transactions would not be under-measured owing to attrition.
2.3 Data Recall Problems
The land history constructed for each household over the period 1967-2004 on the basis of
a one-time survey in 2004 is potentially prone to serious recall problems, as recalling the
details of past changes in landholdings over the past three decades can be a challenging
task. Investigators were specially trained to conduct interviews in a manner that would
help respondents remember and relate the land histories of their household in a consistent
manner. In order to gauge the significance of recall problems, we checked the consistency
of reported landholdings in 1967 and 2004 with reports of land changes in the intervening
period. Starting with the 2004 land holdings, we added in all transactions for any given
year to compute the total land holding in the previous year. Repeating this iteratively, we
calculated landholdings for every previous year until 1967.11 We compare the estimated
landholding in 1967 with that actually reported for that year. For households immigrating
into the village since 1967, we carry out the match for the initial year that the household
arrived in the village.
An additional difficulty arose with the individual exit data: no distinction was made in
the questionnaire between agricultural and non-agricultural land lost thereby (i.e., associated
with the exit). This complicated our calculation of agricultural landholdings. To deal with
this problem we considered three different alternatives. The first assumes that all land
reported in individual exits involved non-agricultural land, and is thereafter dropped. The
second assumes the opposite, i.e. that all land reported in individual exits corresponds to
(unirrigated) agricultural land. Finally, the third alternative assumes that whenever there
is “missing” agricultural land (by the iterative procedure described above), it is accounted
by land lost because of individual exits.
When all land lost owing to individual exits is assumed to be non-agricultural (alterna-
tive 1), around 88% of the households matched their reported landholdings in 1967, up to a
0.2 acre margin of error. This figure increased to 91% when allowing for a 0.5 acre margin
of error. The fact that we were able to reconstruct the land history for many households
implies that imperfect recall problems were negligible. The match rate fell to 82 and 86%
respectively when we assume that land lost from individual exits was entirely agricultural
land (alternative 2). Therefore it seems that land lost from individual exits corresponds to
other uses of land, such as homestead, ponds or orchards. Finally we consider the impli-
cations of assuming that the gap between the reconstructed agricultural land holdings and
the self reported in 1967, if any, had to come from agricultural land reported in the individ-
ual exit data (alternative 3). For this case 89% of the households matched their reported
11For example, consider a household with 2 acres in 2004 that lost 1 acre due to household division in 1995
and bought 3 acres in 1970. Then, we would list the household as owning 2 acres each year from 1995-2004,













landholdings in 1967, up to a 0.2 acre margin of error. This 1% improvement in comparison
with the first alternative corresponds to only 26 households. Hence we do not believe our
lack of knowledge of type of land lost in exits is of any significance. In the rest of the paper,
we use the data implied by the third alternative in order to construct the agricultural land
time series for each household.
Finally, since there was no distinction between irrigated and unirrigated land in the
individual exit dataset, we assumed that all land coming from this dataset was unirrigated.
Whenever possible, we apportioned unirrigated to irrigated land to match initial and final
holdings of irrigated and unirrigated land. There were a few household-year observations in
which households still had negative land holdings, which were set equal to zero.
A similar check for household size and composition indicated consistent reports for 82%
of all households. And when we seek consistent reports of both demographics and land
histories, we end up with 73% of the sample.
We thereafter proceed on the basis of two samples. One is the restricted sample formed
by those households with consistent reports regarding both land and household size. The
other is the full sample. The differences between these two samples are presented in Table 3,
where we ignore discrepancies of less than 0.2 acres. It shows the restricted sample contains
a larger fraction of immigrants and a smaller fraction of medium, large and big landowners.
This is consistent with the expectation that recall problems are less likely for immigrants or
those owning less land. All subsequent results in the paper are shown for both samples, to
gauge the sensitivity of results to possible recall problems.
3 Evolution of Land Inequality in West Bengal (1967-2004)
In this section we exploit our dataset to analyze the trends in demographics and land in-
equality in West Bengal during our period of study. Panel A of table 4 shows household
size fell from 5.9 in 1968 to 5.1 in 2004. At the same time, population grew due to natural
causes (i.e, excess of births over deaths) by 50% between 1968 and 1998.12 The discrepancy
between these owes to divisions of households, which we describe further below.
Panel B of table 4 shows land inequality measures for select years between 1967 and
2004. For the restricted sample within-village inequality (averaged across villages) rose by
17% for the Gini and 29% for the coefficient of variation.13 Panel C of Table 4 shows changes
in the proportion of households in different size classes. Landlessness rose from 38% to 57%.
The rising landlessness was principally responsible for the rise in land inequality: inequality
among the set of landowning households in 2004 did not change much.14 The proportion
12The natural growth of population is estimated using reported births and deaths by households in our
sample. For undivided households this is straightforward. For households experiencing divisions, we calculate
the natural growth rate between divisions for the fragment in our sample, and extrapolate these growth rates
to fragments not in our sample.
13The full sample shows a milder increase for both the Gini and the coefficient of variation.













of households that were either landless or marginal (owning less than 1 acre) rose from
60% to 81% among the entire population.15 This was accounted for by a drop mainly of
small landowners (owning between 1 and 2.5 acres) and big landowners (owning more than
5 acres).
In the online appendix we provide descriptive statistics for the evolution of land owner-
ship, as well as for other covariates of interest such as household size and migration. Average
landownership per household declined 58% between 1967 and 2004, and this decline is not
explained away by looking only at natives (i.e. excluding households who immigrated dur-
ing this period), or because agricultural land was converted to non-agricultural purposes.
Households divisions were the main driving force of this decline – they accounted for over
80% of the loss of land per household. The second channel was land transactions (sales and
purchases), followed by gifts/transfers and land lost or gained due to land reform.
Figure 1 shows the density of the distribution of land for those households owning be-
tween 0 and 3 acres of land (landless households were excluded) for both the full and re-
stricted sample, for three different years (1970, 1985 and 2000). There are two striking
results here. First the density at each of these dates peaks at 0.5 acres, with a sharp drop
below this level. It suggests a minimum viable landholding size around half an acre. Sec-
ond, changes in the distribution involve a lowering of the density between one and three
acres, and a rise in the density at the half acre peak. Combined with the rising incidence of
landlessness, it reveals an increasing tendency for the bottom tail of the land distribution
to have two peaks, one at the half acre mark, and the other at zero. It suggests a process
whereby land owned by most landed households drifted downwards (following division of the
household over time), until it hit the half acre threshold, whereupon the household struggled
to preserve its landholding or joined the ranks of the landless.
Table 5 shows that household splits and other exits accounted for the vast majority of
changes in household size, dominating births, deaths and marriage. Since the splits and
exits for ‘other’ reasons predominate to such a large degree, we define household division
to be any event resulting in a reduction in number of household members. The impact of
household divisions on land inequality is not a priori obvious. Division of big landowning
households would tend to reduce inequality, while division of small landowners would raise
landlessness and inequality. Hence the effects of household division on the land distribution
depend on the size classes in which they are particularly pronounced. To examine this issue,
Table 6 shows division rates and land lost owing to division in the restricted sample, for
different size classes over the entire period. Big landowners divided at a slightly higher rate
than other households. Big and small landowners lost land at roughly the same rate owing
to division, and at a slightly higher rate than marginal, medium or large landowners. The
net effect on inequality is thus unclear from this.
Next, we decompose the changes in inequality across the three principal channels (house-
hold division, land market transactions, and land reform) using the following accounting













exercise. For each of these channels, we calculate the amount of land the household would
have owned in any given year had the landholding change associated with the corresponding
channel not occurred, and all other changes in landholding would have occurred as observed.
We then calculate the average within-village inequality that would have resulted, and sub-
tract this from the observed inequality to estimate the contribution of this channel. Figure
2 shows the results for both full and restricted samples, which indicate clearly that the dom-
inant source of rising inequality was household division, particularly after the mid-1980s.
Land market transactions contributed to a slight increase in inequality in the restricted
sample, while reducing it in the full sample, particularly for the coefficient of variation.16
The role of land reforms is comparable to the one of land market transactions: a slight
increase in the Gini coefficient and decrease in the coefficient of variation for the full sample,
while increasing the Gini coefficient and leaving the coefficient of variation unchanged for
the restricted sample. Hence, land reforms exercised a substantially weaker direct effect on
both the Gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation compared to the direct effect of
household divisions.
Why the land reforms may have directly raised inequality is the following. While the
majority of those receiving land titles were landless, there were many that owned land previ-
ously. The median, 75th and 90th percentile of land previously owned among those receiving
land titles (at the time of receiving the land titles) were 0.5, 3.36 and 5.67 acres respectively.
This indicates there were targeting failures in the implementation of the land distribution
program, which could partly account for their ineffectiveness in lowering inequality.
It is conceivable, moreover, that the land reforms exerted an important indirect effect on
inequality by affecting household divisions and land market transactions. A total assessment
of their impact should incorporate these indirect effects. While subsequent sections will treat
divisions and land transactions as endogenous, we now present a reduced form estimate of
the total impact of the land reform. Table 7 presents cross-village regressions predicting
1998 inequality (measured by the coefficient of variation) by the land reforms implemented
since 1968, controlling for the level of inequality in 1968 and the change in the ratio of
natural population in the village to cultivable land.17 The underlying assumption is that
birth and death rates were exogenous with respect to inequality and land reforms.18 Our
control is a measure of natural growth of population in the village (relative to cultivable
land area) rather than of the actual population, as the latter includes possibly endogenous
effects on migration or household division.
Table 7 shows that the land title program (measured either by the proportion of land
area distributed, or proportion of households receiving land titles between 1968-98) registers
16The results do not change if we include land disposed or acquired as gift in the land market transaction
channel.
17We obtain similar results if we use the Gini coefficient as a dependent variable.
18Results with respect to the effect of the land reforms are similar if we drop the ratio of natural growth
of population to land as a regressor. Hence concerns with possible endogeneity of population growth do not













a negative coefficient, which is statistically significant in the full sample though not in the
restricted sample. The measures of tenancy reform also have a negative coefficient but
are statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the growth of natural population has a
positive and significant direct effect in all specifications, highlighting the important role of
this determinant of land inequality.
Based on the results in column 1, one standard deviation increase in the index of natural
population increases the coefficient of variation by 0.24, while a one standard deviation
increase in percent land distributed decreases the coefficient of variation by 0.06. From
the results in column 2, one standard deviation increase in the index of natural population
increases the coefficient of variation by 0.22, while a one standard deviation increase in
percent land distributed (resp. registered) decreases the coefficient of variation by 0.11
(resp. 0.04). Hence the effects of population growth overshadowed the effects of the land
reforms, resulting in an overall increase in inequality.
Since changes in inequality are closely related to changes in landlessness, we focus next
on a comparable reduced form estimates of effects of land reform and demographic factors
on this variable. Table 8 presents the results of a regression of landlessness in 1998 on the
same measures of land reforms and natural population growth used in the previous Table,
controlling for landlessness in 1978. The dependent variable, as well as the regressors in
columns 1 and 3, are expressed as a proportion of the number of 1978 households, to avoid
the problem arising from possible endogeneity of the number of households with respect to
the land reforms.
The regression shows that the land distribution program had a significant negative ef-
fect on landlessness, when the former is measured by proportion of households registered
(columns 2 and 4). The estimated regression coefficient is -0.125 in the full sample and -0.142
in the restricted sample; both are significant at 1%. Hence titles distributed to 37% of the
1978 population (i.e., a 1 standard deviation increase) resulted in a decline in landlessness by
approximately 5% in 1998. The fact that the ultimate impact is about one seventh the size
of the original direct impact indicates the importance of offsetting indirect effects operating
through induced effects on division or migration patterns, besides targeting failures of the
program.19
The effect of the tenancy reform on landlessness was negative and statistically significant
when measured by the proportion of land registered, but insignificant when measured by
the proportion of households registered. Population growth tended to increase landlessness,
but this effect was statistically significant only in the restricted sample. A one standard
deviation increase in our measure of population to land increased landlessness by 3%. In the
case of landlessness, therefore, the land reforms appear to have had a larger overall impact
than population growth.
In summary, these reduced form estimates show that the overall effects of the land
19Recall that over half the title recipients already owned at least half an acre at the time of receiving the













reforms on land inequality and landlessness were negative. In the case of land inequality,
the effects of land reform were overshadowed by the effects of population growth, whereas the
opposite was true for landlessness. The observed increase in landlessness cannot therefore
be explained by the combination of land reforms and population growth alone: inflows of
new immigrants likely played a role also (with 28% of households having immigrated since
1967, roughly the order of magnitude of the observed increase in landlessness).
4 Theory
In this section we develop a theory of household division and land market transactions,
focusing on problems of free-riding within the household as different members work together
on their jointly owned family farm. We abstract from potential conflicts of interest arising
with regard to collective consumption goods. Our focus is also on purely economic incentives
for division and market transactions. In subsequent sections we shall explain the impacts of
anticipated redistributive policies of local governments.
A household is represented by a vector (n, L), where n denotes the number of adults and
L the amount of land owned jointly by these adults. Household members work together as
a team on their collective farm. They have identical abilities and preferences. Individual
effort cannot be monitored, resulting in a classic moral-hazard-in-teams problem. Collective
income is shared equally among household members. If the household engages in cultivation,





α − w(1 + s)h− F (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and a is a parameter representing crop price and agricultural productivity.
li denotes the labor effort of member i of the household, while h is the extent of labor
hired from the labor market at a wage rate of w. As in Eswaran and Kotwal [1986], hired
workers have to be supervised, which raises the cost of hired workers by a fixed proportion
s > 0. F > 0 is a fixed cost of running a farm, representing costs of acquiring information
about technology and prices, keeping accounts, obtaining water or electricity connections
and engaging in market transactions.
Each household member has a unit endowment of time, and decides to allocate it between
working on the household farm (li) and working on a labor market at a fixed wage w. An
individual member earns income Y
n
+ w(1 − li). Household members may exhibit mutual
altruism, assigning a weight of λ ∈ [0, 1] to the income of every other member in the
household. Hence member i’s objective is to maximize
Y
n
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We assume that the extent of altruism is imperfect so that each member places a lower
weight on the welfare of other members relative to his own: λ < 1. This is the source of
free-riding among household members.
The sequence of decision making is as follows. At the first stage, all members will make
a collective decision concerning whether to engage in cultivation, and the amount of labor
h to be hired on the family farm. At the second stage, each member i will select his own
effort li on the family farm noncooperatively. This reflects either lack of perfect mutual
observability of effort, or inability to enter into enforceable binding agreements concerning
their respective efforts. We shall focus on symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria of
this game, wherein all household members will have the same preferences over h at the first
stage.




)λ] ∈ [ 1
n
, 1). At the second stage after h has been decided, a symmetric
equilibrium will involve individual effort l∗(h) which maximizes
γL1−α[h+ (n− 1)l∗(h) + l]α + w(1− l) (3)













generating payoff per member
Π(h) = [1 + (n− 1)λ]π(h) (5)
where π(h) denotes per member income [ 1
n
{aL1−α[h+nl∗(h)]α−w(1+s)h−F}+w(1−l∗(h))].
Anticipating this, members will agree at the first stage to choose h to maximize π(h), and
will decide to engage in cultivation if the resulting per member income is at least w.






This assumption is relatively inessential as qualitatively similar results also obtain when it
does not hold, though the detailed results differ in that case.20 When (6) holds, (1+s)γ > 1
irrespective of the value of n. We can then classify households into three types on the basis

























20The main difference when (6) does not hold is that there may be two types of cultivating households






















The following Proposition describes the nature of the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Assume that (6) holds.
(i) Conditional on deciding to cultivate, a symmetric equilibrium results in the following:


















1−α } − F ] + w (10)




[aL1−αnα − F ] (11)
(c) For land-rich households: l∗ = 1, h∗ = L[ aα
w(1+s) ]
1












1−α } − F ] + w(1 + s) (12)
(ii) The household decides not to cultivate if the resulting income per member falls below
w, i.e. for land-poor households if:









for medium-land households if:




and land-rich households if:
L < L∗r ≡ [F − nws]a
−1







(iii) There is free-riding (i.e., member incomes are not maximized) only in land-poor
households.
Proof of Proposition 1: Given h, a symmetric equilibrium effort l∗(h) at the second stage
must maximize γaL1−α((n − 1)l∗ + l + h)α + w(1 − l) with respect to choice of l ∈ [0, 1].








, 1}. This implies aggregate labor hours in the household

















The first-stage choice of h will then maximize aL1−αl(h)α−w(1 + s)h subject to h ≥ 0.





1−α ≥ n + h, which implies l∗(h) = 1 and l(h) = n + h. Then h∗ > 0 if and only if
condition (12) holds, i.e., the household is land-rich. In that case we also have l∗ = 1.
If condition (12) does not hold, either (10) or (11) holds. We have h∗ = 0 for these
households. Evidently the equilibrium member effort l∗ = l∗(0) < 1 if (10) holds, while
l∗ = l∗(0) = 1 if (11) holds. The rest of Proposition 1 follows from routine computations.
Land-poor households have ‘surplus labor’: they divide time between working on the
family farm and on the outside market. No workers are hired from the market. Owing to
imperfect altruism, members spend too little time on the family farm. Income per member






1−α on their own farm,
which is larger than what they actually supply (since γ < 1). In households that are not land-
poor, members work full time on the family farm and there is no free-riding: the equilibrium
maximizes income per member. Medium-land households rely entirely on the labor of its
members. Land-rich households encounter enough labor scarcity that it is worthwhile for
them to hire workers from the market. These land-rich households constitute the employers
on the labor market.
For households of any given type, they decide to operate a family farm only if they




r for the three types
respectively. A minimum landholding is necessary to ensure that the household earns enough
from the farm to cover its fixed costs. Those owning less land would not operate a farm
and rely entirely on supplying labor to other farms. The supply side of the labor market is
constituted of such land-poor households.
The model could be closed with wage rates determined by the condition that the labor
market clears. In what follows we shall abstract from the possibility of equilibrium wages
that respond to village level shocks. We assume there is a sufficiently large mass of landless
households in the village, that pin wages down to an exogenously fixed reservation wage
for the landless. The justification for this is empirical: we do not see significant responses
of wage rates to land reforms in West Bengal (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011, Table 14)).
And as we shall see below, there is a large and growing mass of landless households in these
villages, supplemented by inflows of immigrants.
4.1 Household Division
We now discuss how the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 would be modified if house-
holds could sub-divide. To start with we abstract from the possibility of a land market; the
next section will describe the consequences of introducing such a market.
A household is described by its size and landholding (n, L) which enables its members













short-run outcome. Over time, the household can experience change in a variety of ways.
Some members may exit, or the household may divide into two smaller households.
Some members could quit while others remain in cultivation: call this exit or out-
migration. An extreme case of this is when every member of the household decides to
quit and go work full time on the labor market. This is essentially the counterpart of decid-
ing to not cultivate a family farm at all. Call this a shutdown. Finally, the household could
divide into two cultivating households, which we shall refer to as division.
More complicated changes may involve a combination of exit and division, or a division
of the household into more than two households. We shall ignore this for the time being,
as it can be shown it suffices to consider these three kinds of changes to describe stable
household structures.
An important assumption we make is that two households cannot merge into a single
large household. The incentive for a merger could arise from avoiding the duplication of the
fixed costs of farming. This phenomenon is empirically very rare, possibly for the reason that
households are formed around close kinship and familial ties. If the village is partitioned
into ‘familial’ subsets of individuals with high altruism within subsets and low altruism
across subsets, coalitions comprising individuals from disparate ‘families’ would encounter
too much free-riding and would thereby not be stable. In that case households can only be
subsets of families. We have in mind an initial situation where households are of maximal
size within each family, and are subject to division pressures owing to growth in household
size owing to demographic reasons. We abstract from this complication by simply excluding
the possibility of mergers.
We make additional simplifying assumptions of transferable utility and symmetric infor-
mation within each household. So exits and divisions can be accompanied by side-transfers
among members — e.g., exiting members can be given a side-transfer by remaining members.
Under this assumption, exits and divisions will take place if and only if the total income
of members of the original household increases as a result. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 1. A cultivating household (n, L) is stable if its members do not collectively
benefit from a shutdown, exit or division:
Π(n, L) ≥ w (NS)
nΠ(n, L) ≥ mw + (n−m)Π(n−m,L) for any m ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} (NE)
nΠ(n, L) ≥ n1Π(n1, L1)+(n−n1)Π(n−n1, L−L1) for any L1 < L, and any n1 ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}
(ND)
Conversely it is unstable if one or more of these inequalities are violated.
It may be argued that condition (NE) is incorrect if the household that remains after
the exit of m members is induced to shut down (which will happen if Π(n −m,L) < w),













But in this case the consequences of exit would be the same as shutdown, so this case is
covered by (NS). Similarly, in the case of division where Π(n1, L1) < w, but it pays the
remaining household to continue to cultivate, the correct condition should be nΠ(n, L) ≥
n1w + (n − n1)Π(n − n1, L − L1). Since Π is increasing in L, this condition is ensured by
(NE).21
In the absence of a land market and given the assumption of exogenous wages, the
stability of a household is independent of the characteristics of other households in the
village. Hence we can define a stable household distribution as follows. We shall refer to any
household (n, L) as a cultivating household if Π(n, L) ≥ w, and a non-cultivating household
otherwise. A non-cultivating household does not utilize its land: such a household might
gift its land to other cultivating households, or sell it if there is a land market. So without
any loss of generality we can identify non-cultivating households as landless.
Definition 2. A distribution over households (i.e. vectors (n, L)) is stable if there is no
positive fraction of cultivating households that are unstable. Otherwise it is said to be an
unstable distribution.
Our main result below provides a near-complete characterization of the set of stable
cultivating households.
Proposition 2. A cultivating household (n, L) is stable if there is no free-riding and each
member earns at least w, i.e., the following conditions hold:











L ≥ LR(n) (IR)






r for land-poor, medium-land and land-rich households respec-
tively (as defined in Proposition 1).
Conversely, the household is unstable if it violates either (IR) or
n > ⌊nI(L)⌋ (IC
′)
where nI(L) denotes the inverse of LI(n) and ⌊x⌋ denotes the smallest integer exceeding x.
21Nevertheless, there may still be the concern that the notion of stability could fail a consistency condition:
e.g., one of the fragmented households may itself be unstable and prone to further exits or divisions, which
members of the original household ought to anticipate. However, this will not be a problem since further exits
or divisions of one of the fragments would only serve to increase further the collective payoff of the members
of that fragment. So conditions (NS), (NE) and (ND) are necessary for stability. Are they sufficient? In
other words, what about the possibility of division into three or more households, or combinations of exits
and division? This is not a problem for the following reason. Owing to the assumption concerning presence
of fixed costs and CRS technology, a household dividing into two or more fragments will not be able to













Proof of Proposition 2: We start with sufficiency. Suppose there is no free-riding and
each member earns at least w. The latter implies (NS) is satisfied. To show (NE) holds,
note that LI(n) is an increasing function. So for any positive integer m, the equilibrium
outcome for a household with n −m members and L land will involve no free-riding, with
each member selecting l = 1. This implies the marginal contribution of any member in
any such household exceeds w, and so the marginal contribution of m members will exceed
mw, which implies (NE). (ND) follows from noting that the production function defined by
‘output’ equal to collective income of a household plus the fixed cost, and inputs consisting
of land L and household size n (i.e., y(L, n) which equals nπm + F for a medium-land
household and nπr+F for a land-rich household) defines a production set which is a convex
cone. Hence the collective income of the household net of the fixed cost is superadditive.
The necessity of (IR) for stability is obvious. To show necessity of (IC’), suppose this
condition is violated and we have n > ⌊nI(L)⌋. This implies there is free riding at both n
and n− 1, and per member incomes are defined by (10). Hence nπp(n, L) = nw−F +H(n)









1−α } and γ(m) ≡ λ + (1 − λ) 1
m
. Clearly γ(m) is strictly decreasing in m. Hence
nπp(n, L)− (n− 1)πp(n− 1, L) = w +H(n)−H(n− 1) < w, and (NE) is violated.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 3. (IC) is an incentive compatibility condition,
stating that given the land owned by the household, the number of members is small enough
to ensure absence of free-riding: every member supplies maximal effort on the farm. It is a
restatement of the condition that the household be either medium-land or land-rich. The
corresponding necessary condition (IC’) is slightly weaker, owing to the fact that the number
of household members is integer-valued. The necessity of this condition flows from the fact
that land-poor households are characterized by free-riding, and collective household income
is strictly decreasing in the number of members. It then pays one member to exit with a
suitable compensation paid by the remaining household members. Condition (IC) reduces
to a minimum landholding requirement LI(n) which is strictly increasing and strictly convex
in household size n, provided the extent of altruism is imperfect (i.e., λ < 1). Conversely it
amounts to a maximum household size nI(L) corresponding to any given ownership of land.
The existence of a limit to household size arises due to the assumption that altruism
within the household is not perfect. If instead λ = 1, there would never be any free-riding
within the household, and the collective income of the household would be independent









1−α } > F , which does not depend on household size n. As household
size increases, its members would spend proportionately less time per capita working on
the household farm, and more time on the labor market. The total amount of labor on the
family farm, and hence the collective income realized from it would be unchanged. As long
as this collective income is greater than the fixed cost, the farm would be operational and













Returning now to the case with imperfect altruism, condition (IR) is an individual ra-
tionality constraint that corresponds to condition (NS) wherein every member should earn
at least as what they would earn on their own working full time on the labor market. It
translates into a minimum landholding requirement LR(n) given household size. It is ev-
ident that for land-rich households this lower bound Lr(n) is linear and decreasing in n.




. Since stability also requires ‘near-absence’ of free-riding within the household
as expressed by condition (IC’), Lm(n
∗) forms an approximate lower bound to the landhold-
ing of any stable household, irrespective of how many members it has. Hence a stable land
distribution must exhibit a ‘hole’ in-between 0 and Lm(n
∗) quantities of land. Note also
that the minimum landholding size needed to satisfy (IR) depends on both F and w. Even
if F were zero, a minimum land size would be needed to ensure that per capita earnings are
above the wage rate.
The sufficiency of the two conditions arises from the fact that a non-land-poor house-
hold realizes maximal agricultural income from its endowment of labor and land, which
is increasing in n and L. The absence of free-riding in such households implies that the
marginal contribution of each member to household income exceeds the outside wage w.
Hence there are no incentives for exit. There are no incentives for division either — at
best the fragments would be better off cultivating rather than not cultivating (which would
happen if they both continued to satisfy (IR)). And the best-case scenario for division is
when neither fragment is characterized by any free-riding. In that case owing to the constant
returns feature of the production function (ignoring the fixed cost), collective production
would remain the same, and collective income would decline on account of the duplication of
fixed cost F .22 Finally, the (IR) constraint implies that there are no benefits from shutdown.
It is easy to check that the IC and IR curves cross in n− L space at a single point n∗∗.
To the right (left) of this, the IC curve lies above (resp. below) the IR curve. In case A of
Figure 3 where F
w
is high enough (relative to α), they intersect to the right of the bottom
of the IR curve (i.e., n∗∗ > n∗). In the other Case B when F
w
is low, they intersect to the
left of the bottom (n∗∗ > n∗). The implications of demographic growth of the number of
household members can differ between the two cases, as we discuss next.
4.2 Effects of Changes in Demographics and Profitability on the Land
Distribution
Suppose we start with a stable distribution, with support of cultivating households con-
tained in the region bounded below by the intersection of the IR and IC curves, with all
remaining households landless. Now take any cultivating household which is initially in the
stable region, and suppose that the number of household members increases (owing to either
fertility increases or decreases in mortality) while its landholding remains the same.
22For the same reason, division into three or more fragments would not be valuable, when it is not













Consider case B of Figure 3, with relatively low fixed costs. Or suppose we are in case A
instead, but n exceeds n∗. If the number of members increases sufficiently, the IC constraint
will be violated and the household will cease to be stable. As the endowment point moves
across the IC curve, the IR constraint continues to be satisfied. Hence either exit or division
of the household will be induced, rather than a shutdown. The problem is that the household
has too many members relative to its land, inducing some free-riding.
It is also possible that the IR constraint is the first to be violated as the household
size grows relative to its landholding. This would happen for instance in Case A where the
landholding is close to the lower bound Lm(n
∗).
Can we predict whether the outcome of demographic growth will be exit (in which case
n will fall while L of the surviving household will remain unchanged) or division (whence
landholdings of the surviving fragments will be smaller than of the original household)?
Which of these two outcomes will happen will depend on which is associated with a higher
collective income of the members of the original household.23 Note that exit is always
feasible, since the extra number of household members that caused IC to fail can exit so as
to leave a cultivating household with exactly the same number of members as in the original
household. But division may not be feasible, if there was little slack in the IR constraint
to start with. For instance, division is infeasible if the original household owned less than
twice Lm(n
∗), since each of the fragments will have to have at least this amount of land in
order to be viable. At the lower end of the land distribution, thus, demographic growth will
result in exits, resulting in growing landlessness.
Next suppose agricultural profitability (represented by a
w
) increases. This causes the IC
curve to shift outwards, and the IR curve moves downwards — both constraints are relaxed.
This will tend to slow down exits and divisions occurring due to demographic growth.
4.3 Land Market Transactions
Now suppose land can be bought and sold, subject to a unit transaction cost of t. Other
problems that may restrict land market transactions include credit constraints that restrict
purchases, while status effects or insurance value of land that make households reluctant to
sell. Asymmetric information concerning land quality may also create a ‘market for lemons’
problem. We abstract from these here, and focus on the role of costs of registering land
transactions.
Continuing with the assumption of transferable utility and lack of credit constraints or
asymmetric information, two cultivating households (ni, Li), i = 1, 2 will have an incentive
23Suppose the IC constraint is the first one that is violated, with n close enough to nI(L) after the
demographic expansion, and fixed costs F smaller than w. Then had the original household remained intact
the marginal contribution of any member to collective income will be at least w. Hence exit of any member
would result in a reduction in total income by at least w. On the other hand, it is feasible to divide the
household into two cultivating households which are stable, in which case their collective income will decline
by F , which is smaller than w. In this case division is going to happen rather than exit. On the other hand,













to engage in a land transaction of l units if and only if
n1Π(n1, L1 − l) + n2Π(n2, L2 + l)− tl > n1Π(n1, L1) + n2Π(n2, L2)
Since the marginal contribution of land to collective income of any medium-land house-
hold (n, L) equals (1 − α)a(n
L
)α, it follows that there is an incentive for two medium-land
households to enter into a land transaction if and only if their relative endowments differ











The results in the preceding section imply that in order to identify stable land distri-
butions, we can focus on households that are either land-rich or medium land types. All
land-rich households have the same marginal value of land, equal to the value of land for
a medium-land household located at the boundary between the medium-land and land-rich
regions, i.e., with n
L
= b ≡ { αa
w(1+s)}
1
1−α . For purposes of land transactions we can identify
land-rich households with such a medium-land household.
The definition of a stable land distribution must now include the condition that no
two cultivating households should want to enter into a profitable land transaction.24 This
restricts the range of variation of factor proportions among all cultivating households (after
setting the factor proportion of land-rich households to b) to lie within a cone of width which
varies with t
a(1−α) , as shown in Figure 4. The stable region, i.e., support of a stable land
distribution (for cultivating households) must now be contained within the intersection of
such a cone with the areas bounded below by the IC and IR curves. If t is small, this cone
may be contained entirely within the medium-land region. In that case there is a stable
distribution containing only medium-land households. For the same value of t, there could
be multiple cones consistent with the stability condition: there could be another which
includes the factor proportion b and other medium-land households in the interior of the
medium-land region. In this case a stable distribution could include both medium-land
and land-rich types of households. Note in particular that for any t there exists a stable
distribution containing only land-rich households, as there are no incentives for any pair of
land-rich households to trade land.
Demographic growth in some households may now trigger a land transaction rather than
an exit or division. This is shown in Figure 4(b), where a household with a relatively high
initial ratio of labor to land (represented by vector h) moves to h1. It then enters into a
24We ignore the possibility of purchases of land by landless households from cultivating households. Such
transactions are empirically rare. Possible reasons include a large fixed cost F of operating a farm. These
necessitate a large amount purchase of land by the landless, which they may be unable to finance owing
to credit constraints. Moreover these fixed costs would be duplicated, eroding the potential benefits of the
transaction: it would not be profitable if F is sufficiently large relative to w. Additional complications arise
when we consider possible combinations of exits or divisions with land market transactions, so we stop short













land purchase from another household h2 with a relatively low labor-land ratio, with respect
to whom condition (16) is now violated. As a result of the transaction, h1 moves up back
to h3 into the equilibrium cone, while h2 drops down to h4 and continues to remain in the
stable region. Clearly, the likelihood of buying land is increasing in n
L
and in a, while the
likelihood of selling land is decreasing in n
L
and increasing in a.
5 Regression Analysis Results for Household Division, Land
Transactions and Immigration
We now test the predictions of the preceding model with regard to the determinants of house-
hold division and land transactions. Following the discussion of determinants of household
division above, we use the following regression specification:
DIVivt =βi + δt + β1HSi,t−1 + β2Li,t−1 + β3TRv,t−k + β4TRv,t−k ∗ Li,t−1 (17)
+ β4LDv,t−k + β5LDv,t−k ∗ Li,t−1 + β6Cit + ǫivt
where DIVivt denotes a dummy for division, or lands lost owing to division, by household i
located in village v in year t. The regressors include apart from household fixed effects and
year effects, lagged household size HS, landownership L, measures of implementation of the
tenancy reform TR and the land distribution program LD in the village lagged by a few
(k) years25, interactions of these with lagged land owned by the household, and a dummy
C for whether the household owned land in excess of the legal ceiling. We will report both
logit and linear probability versions of this regression. Standard errors of residuals ǫivt are
clustered at the village level.
We also use a similar specification for dummies for whether a household bought or sold
land. The theory indicated that the likelihood of buying or selling would be related to the
ratio of (lagged) household size to land owned, so we include a specification where the log
of this ratio is used as a single regressor apart from household and time effects. This cor-
responds to a different functional form, representing differences in endowment compositions
that motivate land market transactions.
5.1 Regression Results for Household Division
Table 9 presents a logit regression predicting the event that a household experienced a
division in any given year. Columns 1 through 3 show the results for the full sample and
4 through 6 for the restricted sample. Columns 3 and 6 present the specification described
above, with the other columns showing a more parsimonious specification which drop some
of the land reform variables and some interaction terms.
Focusing on columns 3 and 6, we find growth in household size significantly raised the
likelihood of household division. This confirms the notion that demographic growth was a













key determinant of division - households with more family members were more likely to split
up. In column 1, the effect of land owned itself was positive and significant, in contrast to
the theoretical prediction (based on pure economic reasons) of a negative effect. This may in
part be due to large landholders being motivated to divide their property in anticipation of
potential future land reforms. This interpretation is consistent with the significance of the
above-ceiling dummy in column 2 in the full sample (and column 5 in the restricted sample).
Households just above the land ceiling were disproportionately more likely to divide relative
to those just below the ceiling. Inclusion of the dummy reduces the magnitude of the
coefficient of lagged land, and renders it statistically insignificant.
Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 show that the effects of tenancy program are as anticipated by the
theory: an increase in the proportion of cultivable area registered under the program was
associated with a significant fall in division rates for small landowning households, and less
so for larger landowning households. The intercept and slope effects are significant at the
1% level in the full sample and 5% in the restricted sample. For households owning more
than four acres of land, the implied effect is positive. Hence the effect of the tenancy reform
on rates of household division provides one channel by which the former induced a fall in
land inequality.
Columns 3 and 6 show that the land distribution program had a positive effect on division
rates which is statistically insignificant, and an interaction with land size which is negligible
and insignificant. Hence the effect of the land title program on division rates is not precisely
estimated.
5.2 Regression Results for Land Market Transactions
Columns 1-4 of table 10 present logit regressions for the event that a household engaged
in a land sale. There is no evidence of any significant effects of lagged household size,
but lagged landownership clearly matters. Consistent with the theory, columns 1 and 3
show a negative effect of the (log of the) ratio of lagged household size to landownership.
The corresponding regression using household size and land as separate regressors shows
landownership rather than household size to be the important determinant. Columns 2 and
4 pertaining to the likelihood of a land sale show only one significant effect of the land
reform: the land distribution program raised the likelihood of sales among large landowning
households, consistent with the interpretation of anticipated redistribution in the future.
Next, columns 5-8 of table 10 present the corresponding regressions for likelihood of buy-
ing land. We see a converse negative effect of land owned, consistent with the theoretical
prediction. The tenancy reform raised probability of land purchases by small landowning
households, while reducing it for large landowning households (i.e., those owning more than
four acres). The land distribution program has significant effects only in the full sample,
where it attenuated the reduction in the probability of purchase by large landowners. How-
ever this last result is not robust to the choice of sample. These results, as well as those for














In summary, the evidence shows that the land reforms induced greater activity in the
land market. And effects of the tenancy reform on market transactions — raising (resp.
lowering) the likelihood of small (resp. large) landowners buying land — also constituted a
channel by which they indirectly induced a drop in inequality. As in the case of effects on
divisions, we are unable to obtain a precise estimate of the effects of the land title distribution
program.
5.3 Regression Results for Immigration
Table 11 considers the determinants of arrival of immigrants into these villages. It regresses
the proportion of 1998 households that immigrated into the village since 1967, on the extent
of land reforms implemented since 1968, controlling for land per capita in 1968. It is not
surprising to see that villages that were more land-abundant attracted more immigrants.
Moreover, immigrants were more inclined to arrive in villages those in which more land
was distributed through land reforms. The other measures of land reform have statistically
insignificant effects.
This shows one important channel by which the land distribution program exerted a
negative indirect effect on inequality, and a positive effect on landlessness.
5.4 Robustness: Instrumental Variable Estimates for Household Division
One possible concern with the preceding section is that implementation rates may be cor-
related with time-varying village-level unobservables that affect division rates, which would
lead to an endogeneity problem. We now address this concern with a corresponding instru-
mental variable estimator of the effect of the tenancy reform on the likelihood of household
division.
To instrument for tenancy reform, we exploit the fact that there are political economy
determinants of reforms that are plausibly uncorrelated with other factors that would affect
division rates. We base our instruments on [Bardhan and Mookherjee [2010]], which are
also used as instruments for the tenancy program implementation rate in Bardhan and
Mookherjee [2011]. Bardhan and Mookherjee’s [2010] analysis of the political economy
of the land reforms argued that political competition between the Left Front (LF) and
the Indian National Congress (INC), the two principal competing parties in West Bengal
politics played an important role in determining local implementation rates. This gives
rise to an inverted-U relationship between reform implementation rate and the proportion
of local government seats secured by the LF in the previous election, with a peak located
around 50%. Moreover, in villages where one of the two parties, say the LF, was already
strongly entrenched (as indicated by a share of the LF in the current local government
seats that significantly exceeded 50%), a further increase in voter loyalties to the LF at the













and INC in the district in question in most recent elections to the state legislature) would
lower competitive pressure for re-election, and thus reduce implementation rates. Hence
implementation of the tenancy reform in village v in year t can be predicted as follows:
TRvt = γ1LSvt + γ2LS
2
vt + γ3AV SDvt
+ γ4LSvt ∗AV SDvt + γ5LS
2







where LSvt denotes the LF share of local government seats in village v in year t. The com-
position of the local government in turn can be predicted on the basis of lagged incumbency
and recent swings in popularity of the two parties at the state or national levels:





where LSv,t−k is the LF proportion in the previous local government (i.e., prior to the current
local government) elected in year t − k, INCt−l is the number of seats the INC secured in
year t − l, the date of the last election to the national Parliament26, δ′v is a village fixed
effect, and ǫ2vt is an i.i.d. village-year shock.
Combining equation (18) with (19), we obtain a prediction for tenancy reform imple-
mentation in terms of district and national-level loyalties of voters, interacted with lagged
incumbency:
TRvt = ν1LSv,t−k + ν2LS
2
v,t−k + ν3INCt−l ∗ LSv,t−k + ν4AV SDvt
+ν5AV SDvt ∗ LSv,t−k ∗ INCt−l + ν6AV SDvt ∗ LSv,t−k
+ν7AV SDvt ∗ LS
2







with some higher order interaction terms dropped in order to limit collinearity problems,
and Pvt denotes some additional village-year varying predictors such as local infrastructure,
rainfall and the price of rice. This regression predicts implementation rate of the tenancy
program for any given year, which has to be cumulated across past years to predict the total
coverage of the program so far. Hence the instruments are the cumulative totals of these
predictors across past years.
Table 12 presents instrumental variable as well as OLS estimates of the effects of the ten-
ancy reform in a linear probability regression of division rates for small and large landown-
ing households, controlling for the land distribution program, lagged household size and
landownership besides household fixed effects, year dummies and additional village-year
controls. These controls reduce the sample significantly, since they are available only for
years 1982-1996.27 Columns 1-4 present results for the full sample, while columns 5-8 show
results for the restricted sample. The F-statistics and Kleibergen-Paap tests indicate the
26Only the INC had a significant presence in the national Parliament during the period studied, so we
focus only on the national popularity of this party.













instruments are weak, especially in the full sample, while the Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions is comfortably passed.
Regarding the results for the full sample, OLS results are provided in columns 1 and 3 for
the two groups of landowners, with corresponding IV results in columns 2 and 4. Consistent
with the results of the logit in the previous Table, tenancy reform reduced division rates
among small landowners and raise them among large landowners (though the effects fail to
be statistically significant in the IV regressions for small landowners). The gap between the
OLS and IV estimates is not large, with the test of endogeneity bias failing to reject the
hypothesis of absence of endogeneity at any significance level below 0.2.28
The quantitative effect of the land reforms on the division rates implied by these estimates
are not large. They are small especially when compared to the effects of demographic growth,
which helps explain why division rates rose through the period. We estimate growth in
population of native households resulted in an increase in size of undivided households by
approximately 1.3 members.29 The linear probability model IV estimates in Table 12 imply
that this would have increased the likelihood of division of small landowning households in
any given year by .134, whereas the tenancy program would have lowered this by .008.30
Hence the effect of demographic growth on rate of division of small landowning households
was more than sixteen times the impact of tenancy registration. For large landowning
households, the effect of demographic growth was three times that of the tenancy program.31
The effect of land titles distributed is statistically insignificant in column 2 of this Table. If
we nevertheless use the estimated coefficient of -.336, we obtain a predicted impact of -.027
on the likelihood of household division. The total effect of the two land reform programs
is -.035, which is still a quarter of the effect of demographic growth. The scale of the land
reform program was thus too small compared to the extent of population growth for it
to matter quantitatively, resulting in an increase in division rates of both small and large
28Unfortunately, we have not succeeded in finding a set of instruments that can help predict land distri-
bution implementation, so we cannot test for endogeneity bias with regard to that program specifically.
29Native village population grew 22% between 1978 and 1998, using the number of village households
from the indirect survey in Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006, 2010) and the average household sizes in these
two years from the direct household survey. Applied to a mean household size of 5.7 in 1978, this implies
household size would have expanded by approximately 1.3 members, in the absence of any division.
30From column 2, the coefficient with respect to lagged household size is .103, which multiplied by 1.3
yields .134. The coefficient with respect to tenancy registration is -.069, which multiplied by the cumulative
proportion of area registered of .11 yields -.008.
31Similar results obtain upon using the results of the logit specification. The marginal effects implied by
Table 9 in the restricted sample (averaged across all households, with fixed effects set at zero) of household
size was .043, of tenancy registration was -.123 and the land title program was .09. While the effect of
household size is smaller than in the linear probability specification, the effects of the two land reform
programs run in opposite directions and thus neutralize each other. This implies that adding 1.3 members
to household size would imply a rise in division rates by approximately .056. In contrast, the cumulative
effect of the tenancy reform was to lower division rates by .014, while the land distribution program raised
them by .007, with an aggregate effect of -.006. Thus, the effect of demographic growth on the rate of














6 Relation to Existing Literature
A number of West Bengal village case studies (e.g., Lieten, 1992; Sengupta and Gazdar,
1996; Rawal, 2001) have examined changes in land distribution and land market transactions
between the 1970s and 1990s. Lieten [1992] argues that the land reforms in West Bengal
were instrumental in lowering land inequality between 1970 and 1985, and in explaining why
small and marginal landowners in the state own a larger proportion of land compared with
neighboring states Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Our paper is based on a substantially larger
sample of villages and covers a longer time period. It finds an insignificant overall impact of
the tenancy registration program, and a small but significant effect of the land distribution
program. Moreover, our analysis distinguishes between direct and indirect effects of these
land reforms.
Papers by Foster and Rosenzweig [2002] and Guirkinger and Platteau [2011,2012] share
our focus on the process of household division. Foster and Rosenzweig’s theory of household
structure is based on a tradeoff between the benefits of grouping within the same household
to take advantage of risk-sharing and scale economy benefits of household collective goods,
with the costs in terms of resulting lack of diversity in consumption patterns. Their ex-
planation predicts a rise in household division rates as a result of rising agricultural yields
that result from technological progress, which increase the preference for consumption va-
riety and reduce the need to stay together in a single household to realize the benefits of
scale economies. They test their theory structurally using an all-India household panel.
Our explanation of household division focuses instead on problems of land scarcity resulting
from demographic growth, owing to rising incidence of free-riding in joint production ac-
tivities. Moreover, we abstract from considerations of risk-sharing. Our approach predicts
that rising agricultural yields owing to technical progress will reduce the rate of household
divisions by reducing the tendency for free-riding in joint production activities, in contrast
to their prediction that it will raise divisions by heightening intra-household conflict over
joint consumption activities. In our field work we found many instances of households which
continued to live in the same homestead and carry out production on commonly owned land
jointly, while different units within the household cooked and ate in separate kitchens. This
could reflect co-existence of both phenomena stressed by our respective approaches.
By focusing on problems of free-riding within household production activities and the role
of land scarcity relative to household size, our theory of division is closer to that of Guirkinger
and Platteau [2011]. The main difference is that their intra-household model involves an
asymmetric relationship involving rent extraction by a patriarch from other members. This
is in contrast to the symmetric partnership among household members in our model, which
is simpler as a result. Moreover, Guirkinger and Platteau’s main interest is in predicting how













to other members. The latter divide their time between these individual plots and work on
the collective family farm whose returns at the margin accrue to the patriarch. This is an
asymmetric division of land and work between household members that we abstract from.
Part of the reason is that our data does not identify such asymmetries within households.
Guirkinger and Platteau [2012] test the predictions of their theory using a family survey
from southern Mali, focusing mainly on allocation of land within the household between
individual and communal plots. Our concern instead is to explain circumstances under
which households will be induced to split into smaller households, individual members to
exit, or the household to undertake land transactions.
A key feature distinguishing our paper from the ones cited above is the attention we
devote to the question of the effect of land reforms on household division, land market
transactions and land inequality. The effect of tenancy reforms on land inequality is ad-
dressed by Besley et al. [2012] in the context of four south Indian states. Their theory
emphasizes the reduced returns from tenancy and reduced willingness to lease out lands by
landlords, encouraging them to sell land. More skilled farmers belonging to intermediate
castes are able to buy more land as a result; hence land inequality declines. At the same
time, less skilled farmers from lower castes are unable to lease in land, and are forced to be-
come agricultural workers instead. Nevertheless the wage rate rises as a result of an increase
in the demand for hired workers (owing to a rise in skill of cultivators). They confirm these
predictions by comparing changes in land inequality, wage rates and occupational patterns
across villages located near boundaries between states with differing tenancy regulations.
Our paper differs from theirs owing to our focus on the process of household division. On
the other hand it shares an interest in question of the indirect effect of tenancy regulations
on land inequality, as well as the result that such regulations tend to lower inequality by in-
creasing the likelihood of large landowners selling land. Our empirical work is in the context
of a different state in India. Our analysis relies on longitudinal data, while theirs involves
a cross-sectional analysis at state boundaries; accordingly the underlying identification as-
sumptions are different. The land reform measures used are also different: we use area-based
measures of land reforms implemented at the village level rather than the number of tenancy
regulations at the state level.
7 Summary and Concluding Observations
The main question addressed by this paper concerns the effectiveness of land reforms in
reducing land inequality, incorporating its indirect effect via induced household division,
migration and land market transactions. We developed a theory of joint production within
households whose members exhibit some degree of altruism toward one another, yet are not
perfectly altruistic. This implies that the household is subject to inefficient free-riding if
the number of members exceeds a critical size, relative to the amount of land they own.













households, or exit of some members to a labor market while others continue to cultivate,
or a land market transaction (where it either purchases some land or the household sells all
its land and dissolves altogether). The size threshold for the household where it dissolves
depends negatively on farm productivity and positively on the wage rate for hired workers.
The model implies that land reforms can affect household division and land market
transactions through their impact on farm productivity and wages. Increases in farm prof-
itability (via higher productivity or lower wages) reduce the likelihood of division, while
raising the likelihood of land transactions between households of disparate ratios of land
to household size. A tenancy regulation which reduces the profitability of leasing out land
would similarly motivate landlords to sell their land. These channels would be supplemented
by political signaling effects, if implementation of land reforms signal an increased likelihood
of stepped up implementation in the future. Households owning more land than the land
ceiling regulation (and not yet affected by the regulations enacted so far owing to delays in
enforcement) would be motivated to divide or sell land in order to preempt the application
of the regulation to their own context.
While some of these effects are likely to reduce land inequality, others may increase
inequality. Medium and small landholders would be motivated to divide so as to become
eligible beneficiaries of land distribution programs. If farms are subject to some fixed costs or
scale economies over some initial scale of cultivation, a household needs to own a minimum
amount of land in order to remain viable cultivators. Increased division of small landholders
owing to land reforms or population growth would then induce growing landlessness. Land
distribution programs may also induce increased immigration of land-poor households from
other regions, thereby raising landlessness and inequality.
These predictions were tested in the context of West Bengal’s experience over the last
three decades of the 20th century. Reduced form estimates show the land distribution
program significant lowered landlessness, but the net impact was smaller than what the
direct impact ought to have been. This could be accounted partly by targeting failures of
the program (wherein more than half of all recipients already owned at least half an acre
of cultivable land). The effects of the tenancy program on inequality and landlessness was
negative, but less significant and less precisely estimated. The quantitative effects of the
land reforms on inequality were overshadowed by those of population growth resulting from
excess of births over deaths, though the reverse was the case for landlessness.
We subsequently estimated indirect effects of the reforms on land distribution through
their impact on divisions and market transactions. The effects of the tenancy reform — low-
ering division rates among small landowning families and raising them among large landown-
ing households – were precisely estimated, and were robust with respect to choice of sample,
inequality measure and estimation procedure. Analogously, the reform encouraged land
sales by large landowners and purchases by small owners. These results are consistent with
theoretical predictions, and imply a negative overall impact of the tenancy reform on land
inequality. On the other hand, the effects of the land distribution program on household













positive effect on immigration rates, implying a positive indirect effect on landlessness.
The indirect effects of the land reforms on division rates were quantitatively negligible
relative to the effects of population growth. This was mainly because of the corresponding
magnitudes of the two phenomena: the proportion of households or cultivable area covered
by the land reform was much smaller than the growth of population from natural causes.
This helps explain why household divisions and inequality rose during the period, and why
the overall impact of the tenancy reform on inequality was quantitatively negligible. The
land distribution program on the other hand had a direct effect in reducing landlessness (and
thereby land inequality). But this was countered by targeting failures of the program, higher
rates of division among small landowning households, and larger inflows of immigrants that
the programs helped attract. This explains why the land distribution program reduced
landlessness and inequality somewhat, but by an extent that was substantially smaller than
would have been expected from the magnitude of that program.
The issues studied in this paper may not be relevant in contexts of large scale land re-
forms of the kind carried out in early 20th century Mexico, in East Asia in the 1950s, or the
more recent post-socialist transition experiences of China or Vietnam. Such reforms were
carried out in the aftermath of revolutions or wars in a non-democratic context, where direct
beneficiaries constituted the vast majority and there were relatively few large landowning
households with the opportunity to circumvent the land reforms by sub-dividing proper-
ties or engaging in land market transactions. The West Bengal experience is likely to be
more relevant for countries that embark on land reform within a peaceful democratic con-
text (analogous to the reforms in Brazil or South Africa in the last two decades). In these
countries, direct beneficiaries constitute a minority, and there is a functioning land market.
Hence there is scope for the land reform to generate large indirect effects through mar-
ket transactions, immigration and household division. As mentioned in the Introduction,
analysis of the Brazilian experience by Assunção [2008] showed that the land reforms were
surprisingly ineffective in lowering land inequality and landlessness. It would be interesting
to understand better the reasons for this, and how they relate to our findings for West
Bengal.
Our findings indicate the importance of demographic factors in explaining changes in
land distribution, and raises a number of new questions in this regard. For instance, what
were the causes of high rates of division among small and marginal landowning households
that induced rapid growth of landlessness? What was the role of changing fertility and
mortality patterns? Conversely, did the land reforms affect fertility or mortality rates? One
hopes that future research will be devoted to these questions, and thereby generate better
understanding of inter-connections between household demographics, human development
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Notes: Landless households are excluded, as well as households owning more than 3 acres of land. All




























































































































Division/exit contribution Market contribution Reform contribution































Notes: Stable areas are depicted in light grey. Area 1 is characterized by no free-riding (l∗ = 1), positive
hired labor (h∗ > 0) and income increases in family size Y ′(n) > 0. In area 2 there is no free-riding
(l∗ = 1), no hired labor (h∗ = 0), and income increases in family size (Y ′ > 0). Finally, in area 3 there is
free-riding (l∗ < 1), no hired labor (h∗ = 0), and income does not increase in family size (Y ′ = 0).


















Notes: (a) Characterization of Stable Households with Land Market Transactions. (b) Land Transactions













Table 1: Income, consumption and occupation by land ownership status
land category Landless Marginal Small Medium Large Big
A. Household size
Average household size 4.64 4.80 5.67 6.76 7.93 9.11
B. Sources of Income (rupees)
Farm income 676 5,203 17,047 27,924 35,008 57,259
Wage income 1,032 1,466 309 43 0 0
Remittances 270 541 442 492 960 0
Other income 139 52 454 1,022 760 0
Total 2,117 7,262 18,252 29,481 36,728 57,259
C. Consumption (food and durable goods)
Two meals a day (%) 88.18 91.01 96.92 97.66 98.00 92.59
Own house (%) 81.41 92.16 94.62 97.27 98.00 100.00
At least one cow (%) 55.66 65.85 80.00 87.50 90.67 92.59
TV (%) 26.65 25.16 49.23 53.91 72.00 85.19
Radio (%) 35.37 38.40 45.38 45.70 54.00 70.37
Refrigerator (%) 2.85 1.63 6.15 8.98 15.33 22.22
D. Occupation of adults in the household
Housework (%) 37.38 37.36 36.07 36.62 37.08 34.31
Student (%) 6.88 8.17 12.72 12.73 12.30 17.05
Employee (%) 5.57 4.55 4.39 4.86 7.03 6.91
Non-agricultural worker (%) 39.09 26.12 17.77 14.48 16.36 17.64
Agricultural worker (%) 10.09 11.91 1.95 1.47 0.56 0.00
Own cultivator (%) 0.56 11.64 26.42 29.03 26.06 23.16
N 1,227 612 130 256 150 27
Notes: Data comes from responses at the time of the survey (2004). Land categories are defined as follows.
Landless households do not own agricultural land, marginal households own between 0 and 1.25 acres,
small households own between 1.25 and 2.5 acres, medium households own between 2.5 and 5 acres, large
households own between 5 and 10 acres, and big households own more than 10 acres. In D figures are
constructed considering all household members older than 14, and only their primary occupation.
Table 2: Multiple-male households engaged in own cultivation
land category Landless Marginal Small Medium Large Big
(a) Households engaged in own cultivation 33 372 113 220 127 26
(b) Households with at least one male en-
gaged in own cultivation
32 357 110 219 125 26
(c) Households with at least one pair of
male siblings engaged in own cultivation
0 21 18 70 53 11
(d) (b)/(a) 0.970 0.960 0.973 0.995 0.984 1
(e) (c)/(b) 0 0.059 0.164 0.320 0.424 0.423
Notes: Households are considered as engaged in own cultivation if at least 1 adult reports own cultivation













Table 3: Comparing samples
Full Restricted Difference between
Sample Sample columns 1 and 2
(1) (2) (3)
Household size 5.159 5.098 0.065
(2.496) (2.389) (0.074)
Fraction of immigrant households 0.303 0.332 -0.046
(0.460) (0.471) (0.013)***
Total agricultural land 1.100 0.950 0.208
(2.265) (2.081) (0.063)***
Irrigated agricultural land 0.732 0.658 0.161
(1.785) (1.582) (0.051)**
Unirrigated agricultural land 0.368 0.346 0.047
(1.287) (1.219) (0.034)
% Landless 53.42 56.60
% Marginal (between 0 and 1.25 acres) 25.11 24.46
% Small (between 1.25 and 2.5 acres) 5.13 4.90
% Medium (between 2.5 and 5 acres) 9.51 8.29
% Large (between 5 and 10 acres) 5.58 4.74
% Big (more than 10 acres) 1.26 1.01
N 2402 1697
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report means with standard errors in parentheses. Means are computed using
only survey answers for the year 2004. Column 2 includes those households for which both the constructed
land holding and family size matched the reported in 2004. Column 3 reports tests for differences of means
across columns 1 and 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Tests are based on regressions with













Table 4: Trends in inequality and land reform, selected years
1968 1978 1988 1998 2004
A. Population
Observed average household size 5.903 5.299 4.854 4.971 5.098
Index of natural population 100 150.8
B. Within-village inequality measures
Gini coefficient 0.551 0.567 0.617 0.639 0.649
Coefficient of variation 1.360 1.410 1.547 1.677 1.734
C. Share of households by land category
Landless 37.68 43.31 48.58 53.93 56.60
Marginal 22.61 20.53 22.81 25.10 24.46
Small 11.84 11.12 9.31 5.49 4.90
Medium 13.52 13.22 10.32 8.68 8.29
Large 10.25 8.16 6.75 5.49 4.74
Big 3.98 3.65 2.23 1.30 1.01
D. Land reform
Cumulative % land registered×100 0.03 5.22 13.57 11.02
Cumulative % land distributed×100 0.00 1.88 7.52 7.94
Cumulative % households registered×100 0.19 4.92 7.21 5.92
Cumulative % households distributed×100 0.00 8.54 19.69 19.15
Notes: Numbers reported above are simple (i.e. unweighted) averages. In panels A, B and C, data from
the restricted sample is used. Average natural population is normalized to 100 in 1968. % land registered
and % land distributed are computed as the proportion of land affected by each program over the total
cultivable land in each village. % households registered and % households distributed are computed as the
proportion of households affected by each program over the total number of households per village.
Table 5: Household division: Summary statistics
# Total Mean 50th p. 75th p. 95th p.
(1) Death of member of the household 1,525 106.71 0.07 0 0 0.04
(2) Exit of spouse of head 49 15.88 0.32 0 0 2
(3) Out-marriage 1,576 203.96 0.13 0 0 0.67
(4) Division due to other reasons 6,551 2648.24 0.40 0 0.16 2.16
Notes: All figures are in acres, except for #, the total number of events. Reasons stated in (4) include














Table 6: Division rates and proportion of land lost, in different size classes 1967-2004 (re-
stricted sample)







Notes: The first column shows the annual proportion of households that divided in a given period of time.
The second column indicates the proportion of land that households lost due to division. Division means
one or more members left the household. Numbers are percentages.
Table 7: Effect of land reform on inequality reduction: reduced-form village regressions
1968-98
Dependent variable: Coefficient of variation in 1998
Sample: full restricted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient of variation in 1968 0.551*** 0.530*** 0.693*** 0.679***
(0.136) (0.130) (0.123) (0.124)
Cumulative % land registered -0.004 -0.037
(0.023) (0.031)
Cumulative % land distributed -0.255** -0.805
(0.100) (0.626)
Cumulative % households registered -0.453 -0.368
(0.280) (0.555)





0.047*** 0.042*** 0.063*** 0.063***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020)
Constant 0.670*** 0.804*** 0.645*** 0.685***
(0.151) (0.152) (0.151) (0.158)
Adjusted R-squared 0.534 0.564 0.518 0.516
Observations 88 88 83 83
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. In (1) and (3), % land registered and % land distributed are
computed as the proportion of land affected by each program over the total cultivable land in each village
in 1998. In (2) and (4), % households registered and % households distributed are computed as the
proportion of households affected by each program over the total number of households per village in 1998.
Change in naturalpopulation
land
is defined as the difference between the natural population to land ratio in 1998













Table 8: Effect of land reform on landlessness: reduced form village regressions 1978-98
Dependent variable: Proportion of households landless in 1998
Sample: full restricted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion households landless in 1978 0.863*** 0.836*** 0.819*** 0.810***
(0.085) (0.078) (0.081) (0.080)
Cumulative % land registered -0.021** -0.028***
(0.008) (0.010)
Cumulative % land distributed 0.011 -0.611***
(0.065) (0.170)
Cumulative % households registered -0.077 -0.065
(0.095) (0.115)





0.004 0.003 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.078*** 0.127*** 0.133*** 0.150***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.040) (0.042)
Adjusted R-squared 0.649 0.694 0.635 0.645
Observations 88 88 85 85
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is number of 1998 landless
households divided by number of 1978 households in each village. In (1) and (3), % land registered and %
land distributed are computed as the proportion of land affected by each program over the total cultivable
land in each village in 1998. In (2) and (4), % households registered and % households distributed are
computed as the proportion of households affected by each program over the total number of households
per village in 1978. Change in naturalpopulation
land
is defined as the difference between the natural population














Table 9: Determinants of household division, using past reform, average of last three years
Dep. Variable: Probability of division
Sample: full restricted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged HH size 0.417*** 0.448*** 0.448*** 0.496*** 0.521*** 0.521***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040)
Lagged land 0.125*** 0.067 0.067 0.117*** 0.067 0.068
(0.043) (0.046) (0.047) (0.040) (0.053) (0.053)
% land registered -0.294*** -0.295*** -1.840** -1.841**
(0.044) (0.040) (0.931) (0.939)
Lagged land*% land registered 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.427** 0.427**
(0.020) (0.018) (0.188) (0.190)
Above-ceiling dummy 1.221** 1.222** 0.546 0.545
(0.497) (0.497) (0.690) (0.687)
% land distributed 0.339 1.193
(0.699) (1.370)
Lagged land*% land distributed -0.022 -0.126
(0.078) (0.259)
Observations 40,621 36,870 36,870 28,011 25,442 25,442
Pseudo R2 0.0868 0.0908 0.0908 0.0938 0.0975 0.0975
Notes: Logit coefficients reported with robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on
villages. All regressions include year dummies and household fixed effects. The variables % land registered
and % land distributed are computed as the sum over the previous three years of the share of land affected
by each program over the total cultivable land in each village, using official land records. ***, ** and *













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Determinants of immigration, cross section 1978-98
Dependent variable: Proportion of post-1967 immigrant households in 1998
Sample full restricted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative % land registered -0.004 -0.002
(0.015) (0.016)
Cumulative % land distributed 0.175** 0.581***
(0.069) (0.204)
Cumulative % households registered -0.168 -0.138
(0.146) (0.209)
Cumulative % households distributed 0.095 0.108
(0.076) (0.083)
Land per capita -0.158** -0.164** -0.192** -0.190**
(0.066) (0.071) (0.079) (0.082)
Constant 0.238*** 0.245*** 0.260*** 0.281***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037)
Observations 89 89 88 88
Adjusted R-squared 0.067 0.031 0.095 0.029
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. In (1) and (3), % land registered and % land distributed are
computed as the proportion of land affected by each program over the total cultivable land in each village.
In (2) and (4), % households registered and % households distributed are computed as the proportion of
households affected by each program over the total number of 1978 households per village. Land per capita
is the ratio of cultivable land to village population in 1978. All measures of land registration and land
distribution are computed on the basis of official land records. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.
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